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INTRODUCTION  
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has recently stated that “[w]arming 
of the climate system is unequivocal” and that “many of the observed changes are 
unprecedented over decades to millennia.”1 With its Fifth Assessment Report, the 
IPCC confirms that human induced changes to the earth’s climate system are likely 
to pose one of the most significant global policy challenges in the coming years.2  
For more than 20 years, most countries in the world, including Canada,3 have 
participated in efforts to create an international legal regime that can address this 
challenge.  The result has been the creation of two main international instruments, 
the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and its companion 
Kyoto Protocol.4  Canada has been a party to both the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 
Although Canada withdrew from the latter in 2012, the country remains a party to 
the FCCC and is engaged in the process of negotiating a successor instrument to the 
Kyoto Protocol.5   
 
 
 The effectiveness of the international climate regime has been questioned 
and Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol appears to vindicate concerns 
about the impact of the international regime. Although Canada did face criticism in 
*Cherie Metcalf is currently an Associate Professor at Queen’s University - Faculty of Law and has formerly served as a clerk to both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from UBC and completed her LL.M. at Yale University.   1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Summary for Policy Makers” in Thomas F 
Stocker et al, eds, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3 at 4, online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/>. The full WG I report was 
approved Sept. 27, 2013 by the IPCC and the Summary for Policy Makers was approved and released 
online on Nov. 11, 2013. 2 Ibid. 3 For a summary of Canada’s participation in the international climate regime, see UNFCCC 
<http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?country=CA>.  4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, 31 ILM 849 
[FCCC]. 5 Canada officially withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol as of December 15, 2012, having previously 
announced its intention to do so. See UNFCCC, “Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol”, online: 
UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php> for a list of Kyoto 
participants and dates of major actions under the protocol. 
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the international setting for its withdrawal from Kyoto and its failure to abide by its 
prior commitments, it faced no consequences under the international climate law 
regime.6 However, international law can have important impacts beyond its formal 
legal reach and potential for direct sanctions to produce compliance.  
 
 
 Scholars have identified a variety of theories of international law, each 
suggesting mechanisms through which international law can influence state 
behaviour. International law is regarded by some as merely the outcome of state 
interests; states comply or not as it suits their interests. However, international law 
can still serve as a means to coordinate state policy and facilitate cooperative 
outcomes.7 Others ascribe normative significance to international law; international 
law plays a role in “constructing” norms against which state behaviour can be 
measured and judged, inducing compliance.8 Recent research has begun to uncover 
mechanisms through which international law can penetrate states domestically. 
While early work focused on networks of government actors and opinion-shaping 
elites, more recently the focus has shifted to the role of international law in more 
directly driving domestic public opinion. 9 International law can influence public 
perceptions of policy by providing information on choices made by other states, 
causing voters to shift their opinions and generating pressure on domestic 
governments. 10  The process of international treaty-making forces domestic 
governments to reveal their positions on issues; gaps between domestic policy and 
international law can induce domestic mobilization and public pressure. 11  The 
6 See e.g. Jane Matthews Glenn & José Otero, “Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: An Aesop Fable” in EJ 
Hollo et al, eds, Climate Change and the Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013) 489 at 490, 505 (criticism of 
Canada’s general rejection of Kyoto obligations). 
7 See e.g. Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A 
Rational Choice Perspective” (2002) 31:1 J Legal Stud S115. 
8 See Oona Hathaway & Ariel Lavinbuk, “Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law”, Book 
Review of The Limits of International Law by Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, (2006) 119:5 Harv L Rev 
1404 at 1415 (traditional international legal scholars view that international law has moral and legal force 
that induces compliance), 1411 (discussing Constructivist theory, role of international law as normative 
influence). See also Jutta Brunnee & Stephen Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of 
an Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39:1 Colum J Transnat’l L 19. 
9 For early work, see e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Liberal Theory of International Law” (2000) 94 Am 
Soc’y Int’l L Proc 240; Harold Hongju Koh, “The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home" (1998) 35:3 Hous L Rev 623. 
10 See e.g. Katerina Linos, “Diffusion through Democracy” (2011) 55:3 Am J Pol Sc 678; Katerina Linos, 
The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and Employment Laws Spread 
Across Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). The effect results when voters become 
informed about the international commitments of other states, and is more likely for larger, more powerful 
and politically and culturally proximate states reported on by the media. 
11 See e.g. Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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existence of international law and treaty obligations can exert an influence on 
individuals’ evaluation of government policy choices.12 Scholars have also begun to 
dismantle the state, recognizing that the impact of international law can vary 
depending on which domestic actors are “supplying” compliance.13   
 
 
In this paper, I will argue that the influence of the international climate 
regime in Canada cannot be determined simply by the formal status of Canada’s 
participation and obligations at international law. Consistent with the theory above, 
the impact of the international climate regime is more complex. In particular, the 
decentralized nature of Canada’s domestic environmental competence under 
Canadian federalism leads to a diverse and uneven penetration of international 
climate law and its norms into our domestic environmental law. Provinces may lead 
where the federal government does not follow in incorporating international 
obligations into domestic law. A review of Federal and Provincial climate law and 
policy illustrates a number of means through which the international regime may be 
considered influential. In particular, the international regime’s potential influence is 
apparent in enhanced transparency on climate change and governments’ responses, a 
move toward accountability in the form of setting targets and timetables, coordinated 
and cooperative methods of attacking climate change, and through a shift toward 
climate change adaptation planning. While the review does not serve as a causal test 
of the influence of international climate law, it is suggestive of an important role for 
the international regime. 
 
 
The broad-based, multilateral nature of the UN climate instruments lends 
normative force to the commitments contained in the agreements, making them a 
reference point for acceptable climate policy. In addition, the mechanisms developed 
under the international climate regime provide a natural coordination point for 
climate policy choices. Even without any direct formal legal obligations under the 
FCCC or Kyoto, provinces appear to be influenced by the international regime in 
setting their policies. Beyond this, international climate law also helps shape the 
normative assessment of the behaviour of governmental actors and exerts an 
influence on public opinion, both within Canada and in other jurisdictions, opening 
up an additional channel through which international climate law is domesticated.  
International climate law is an important influence on Canada’s domestic climate 
12 See Adam Chilton, “The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An 
Experimental Study” Chi J Int’l L [forthcoming] (causal effect showing that existence of prior treaty 
commitment influenced participants opinions of government behavior; violation of treaty promise 
evaluated more negatively). 
13 See Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, “Supplying Compliance: Why and When the United States 
Complies with WTO Rulings” Yale J Int’l L [forthcoming] (focusing on US setting, contrasting 
legislative, executive and judicial “supply-side” actors).  
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policy, and Canada’s continued participation is vital to shaping the international 
regime as it evolves. 
 
 
To develop these arguments in more depth, I will first briefly review the 
main components of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol to draw out the major normative and procedural aspects of these 
international instruments. I will then turn to a review of Canada’s domestic climate 
policy to trace the influence of the international regime, considering actions at the 
federal, and provincial levels.  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE LAW 
 
1.  The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was one of a number of 
key multilateral environmental agreements originating at the Rio Conference in 
1992.14 As a framework convention, the FCCC was not intended to finalize the 
details of substantive international climate regulation, but rather to create a 
framework within which countries would work together to address the problem of 
global climate change. With its nearly universal membership, the FCCC continues to 
serve as the main coordination point for international action to address climate 
change. 15 
 
 
The FCCC stands as a powerful consensus recognition that anthropogenic 
climate change is a global threat and sets a shared normative goal to engage in 
collective action to mitigate the problem. The FCCC identifies climate change as “a 
common concern of humankind” 16  and establishes an objective to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations and “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.”17 While the FCCC leaves the specifics of this threshold to 
be determined, it does call for action within a timeframe that will “allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened 
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”18  
14The other convention opened for signature at Rio was the Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 
1992, 1760 UNTS 79, 31 ILM 818. 
15 Currently 194 States and 1 Regional Economic Unit are parties to the FCCC, see UNFCCC, “Status of 
Ratification of the Convention”, online: UNFCCC 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php>.  
16 FCCC, supra note 4, Preamble. 
17 Ibid, art 2. 
18 Ibid.  
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To achieve this goal the FCCC commits state parties to measures to mitigate 
climate change, focusing on anthropogenic emissions from sources and removals by 
sinks.19 The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”20 requires a 
more substantial commitment from developed country parties; their policies are to 
demonstrate that “developed countries are taking the lead” in changing the trend in 
emissions in line with the objective of the Convention. 21   While the FCCC’s 
substantive mitigation obligation is highly qualified, even for developed countries, 
the norm is that all parties will endeavor to advance the objective of the Convention, 
by reducing emissions and enhancing sinks. All parties are also to develop measures 
to facilitate adaptation to climate change, cooperating to prepare for climate 
change. 22  In establishing these substantive goals, the FCCC explicitly promotes 
cooperation, and joint implementation of the Convention.23 
 
 
A key aspect of the FCCC framework is state commitments to generate and 
share information. All parties agree to generate national inventories of their 
emissions and make them available to the Conference of the Parties (COP).24 Parties 
similarly commit to formulating and publishing their mitigation programs. 25  
Developed country parties have enhanced reporting commitments, periodically 
providing detailed information on their mitigation policies with corresponding 
projections of anthropogenic emissions – allowing the effectiveness of these parties’ 
measures to be assessed.26 The FCCC promotes cooperation in research related to 
climate change, including scientific, technological, and socio-economic research.27 
19 Ibid, art 4(1). 
20 Ibid, art 3. 
21 Ibid, art 4(2)(a). The reported progress in emissions regulation under developed country parties’ policies 
and measures is judged against “the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels” (ibid, art 
4(2)(b)). 
22 Ibid, art 4(1). 
23 See e.g. FCCC, ibid, art 4(2), which explicitly endorses joint implementation of developed country 
mitigation policy. 
24 Ibid, art 4(1). The requirement is for net emissions, including both an inventory of emissions by sources 
and also removals by sinks. The inventories are to be updated “periodically” and employ “comparable 
methodologies”. Non-Annex I parties have more flexibility in their obligations, as they are qualified by 
their capacity to produce inventories and there is no fixed timetable for reports. For more detail on 
applicable guidelines and submitted reports for both Annex I and non-Annex I parties, see UNFCCC, 
“National Reports”, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php>.  
25 FCCC, supra note 4. 
26 Ibid, art 4(2). 
27 Ibid, art 4(1). Information is particularly targeted to understanding the climate system and climate 
change, and the consequences of response strategies. Parties are also required to provide support for 
international and intergovernmental research efforts under the FCCC (ibid, art 5).  
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Parties also agree to “[p]romote and cooperate in education, training and public 
awareness” related to climate change. 28  These FCCC measures promote more 
informed dialogue about climate change and help foster transparency and 
accountability of state parties in meeting their FCCC commitments. 
 
 
Addressing the distributive effects of climate change and mitigation and 
adaptation efforts is another key prong of the FCCC. In addition to the principle of 
“common but differentiated” responsibilities, the FCCC incorporates financial and 
technological transfers to assist less developed and particularly vulnerable states with 
the costs of climate change.29 The FCCC puts the onus on developed countries to 
facilitate developing country success in meeting the Convention objectives.30 
 
 
2.  The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention 
 
The FCCC sets out normative goals for climate change mitigation, but as a 
framework convention it lacks detailed standards for concrete commitments by 
parties. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in December 1997, was designed to address 
this gap.31  
 
 
The major innovation of the Kyoto Protocol was the adoption of quantified 
emissions limitation or reduction targets.32 In keeping with the FCCC’s emphasis on 
common but differentiated responsibilities, only the developed country Annex I 
parties to the FCCC faced binding emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.33 
The Protocol incorporated country specific limitations / reductions, with an overall 
objective of reducing emissions by at least 5% from 1990 levels during the first 
28 Ibid, arts 4(1)(i), (6). The FCCC requires parties to promote public participation as part of carrying out 
their commitments, through development of education and public awareness, by providing access to 
information on climate change and its effects, by encouraging public participation in developing climate 
change strategies, and by training scientists and other technical and managerial experts. 
29 Ibid, arts 4(3)-4(5). Developed country parties are to provide funds to assist developing country parties 
with their compliance obligations, including technology transfer and “full incremental cost” (ibid, art 4(3)) 
financing. Developed countries are also to assist states particularly vulnerable with costs of adaptation. 
30 Ibid, art 4(7). 
31 The Protocol came into force in February 2005 and its first commitment period ran from 2008-2012. For 
general information on the Kyoto Protocol, and access to associated UN documents, see UNFCCC, 
“Kyoto Protocol”, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php>. 
32 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 
2303 UNTS 162, 37 ILM 22 [Kyoto Protocol], art 3. 
33 Ibid, art 3(1).  
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commitment period. 34  In December 2012, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol introduced a new target for the second commitment period of an 18% 
reduction from 1990 levels. 35 The operative standard for the Protocol is thus the 
adoption of emissions reduction targets with associated timetables for developed 
country parties. While the Kyoto Protocol did not introduce any specific targets for 
developing countries, a feature that has become increasingly contentious, it reaffirms 
the commitments of all parties under the FCCC. Developing country parties thus 
reaffirm a conditional commitment to pursue measures to “mitigate climate change” 
and “facilitate adaptation.”36 
 
 
In addition to specifying targets and timetables, the Protocol requires Annex 
I parties to implement and elaborate “policies and measures” in relation to meeting 
their targets, providing a set of exemplars.37 The Protocol specifically identifies and 
approves actions such as: increased energy efficiency; enhancement of sinks, 
including through forest policy; sustainable agricultural policy; research and 
development of new and renewable energy, including technology for carbon 
sequestration; elimination of “market imperfections” that are inconsistent with the 
Convention’s objective and use of market measures; sectoral reforms that limit 
emissions, including a specific focus on the transport sector; and limitation of 
methane emissions from waste management and energy production and 
distribution. 38  A similar set of exemplars that extends to developing country 
programs is set out in the Protocol.39The protocol recognizes great flexibility in the 
means by which parties may pursue mitigation targets, but at the same time singles 
out particular strategies as legitimate policies. 
 
 
A key aspect of Kyoto’s stricter, quantifiable emissions limitations / 
reductions for its Annex B parties, was the incorporation of flexibility mechanisms 
34 The country specific quantified emissions reductions relative to the base year are found in Annex B to 
the Protocol. The countries with binding Kyoto commitments are often referred to as the Annex B parties 
to the Protocol. 
35 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 8 December 2012, C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c (not 
yet in force). The Doha Amendment was adopted by decision 1/CMP.8, at the eighth session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The second 
commitment period runs from 2013-2020. 
36 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 32, art 10. 
37 Ibid, art 2(1)(a). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, art 10. The programs for mitigation and adaptation that are specifically mentioned include: energy, 
transport and industry sectors, agriculture, forestry and waste management.  
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through which these might be met.40 While parties are intended to primarily fulfill 
their obligations through domestic action, the Kyoto Protocol also allows joint 
implementation (JI),41 emissions trading between Annex B parties,42 and, via the 
clean development mechanism (CDM), transfers of emissions reductions to Annex B 
countries from investments in climate change mitigation in developing countries.43 
Together the flexibility mechanisms work to generate and support a carbon market. 
The flexibility mechanisms are intended to help reduce the costs of compliance with 
Kyoto targets, promote collective action to address climate change, and provide a 
means to incentivize climate change mitigation investment and capacity building in 
developing countries.  
 
 
Both the incorporation of quantified emissions targets and timetables and 
flexibility mechanisms under Kyoto increased the need for verification and 
transparency in reporting. The Protocol thus builds on the reporting architecture of 
the FCCC. Annex I parties require national systems to estimate anthropogenic 
emissions and removals, with methodologies approved by the Meeting of the Parties 
to the Protocol, and consistent with the methodology of the IPCC.44 Parties are to 
provide annual inventories of green house gasses, including data to evaluate 
compliance with the Protocol.45 Periodic national communications are also required 
which include supplementary information to assess compliance with the Protocol.46 
Both inventories and national communications under the Protocol are subject to 
review by international teams of experts.47 The Protocol also facilitates harmonized 
standards for the operation of its flexibility mechanisms. 48  The development of 
consistent standards is part of the effort to ensure transparency and verifiability in 
40 For discussion of details involved in implementing flexibility mechanisms under Kyoto, particularly the 
CDM, see e.g. Meinhard Doelle, “The Cat Came Back, or the Nine Lives of the Kyoto Protocol” (2006) 
16:3 J Envtl L & Prac 261. 
41 Supra note 32, art 6. 
42 Ibid, art 17. 
43 Ibid, art 12. 
44 Ibid, art 5 (failure to use accepted methods can result in adjustments to country inventory figures under 
this article).  
45 Ibid, art 7(1). 
46 Ibid, art 7(2). 
47 Ibid, art 8. 
48 Ibid, arts 6(2),12(7), (17). The COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol has elaborated 
guidelines for appropriate implementation of these mechanisms, see e.g. Report of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal 
from 28 November to 10 December 2005: Addendum: Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its first session, UNFCCC, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (2006) [mimeo] for Decisions that provide guidelines for Articles 6, 7 and 
17.  
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international climate action, and also helps facilitate the integration of national and 
regional instruments into the international climate regime.49  
 
 
As with the FCCC, the Kyoto protocol also addresses adaptation and the 
need to support developing and vulnerable states through provision of financial 
resources and technology transfer.50 An Adaptation Fund created under the Protocol 
provides funding for specific adaptation projects in developing country parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to climate change.51 
 
 
Overall, the major innovation of Kyoto was to complement the FCCC’s 
broad normative obligations with firm targets and timetables for emissions 
reductions by the developed country parties. This was to start parties along a path to 
effective collective international action to limit emissions, while continuing to place 
developed countries in the lead role. Kyoto’s targets and timetables set specific 
benchmarks against which climate change progress could be measured, and the 
Protocol enhanced the transparency and rigour of reporting. Kyoto’s flexibility 
mechanisms also provided coordinated international support for the use of market 
mechanisms to address climate change. However, it was clear from the outset that 
more would be needed , due to the absence of reduction commitments by major 
emitters including the US, China, and India. 
 
 
3.  Recent Developments in the International Climate Regime 
 
Recent developments in the international climate regime reflect recognition of the 
“emissions gap” between global emissions and the level needed to achieve the FCCC 
objective.52 Adaptation has taken on a higher profile and negotiation has shifted to 
development of a new “universal” instrument to address emissions. 
 
 
49 For example the EU Emissions Trading System operates as a regional market mechanism integrated into 
the Kyoto framework. 
50 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 32, arts 10, 11. For more detailed discussion of adaptation obligations under 
the international climate regime, see e.g. Jonathan Verschuuren, “Legal Aspects of Climate Change 
Adaptation” in EJ Hollo et al, supra note 6, 257. 
51 For a general description and a gateway to documents related to the Adaptation Fund, see UNFCCC, 
“Adaptation Fund”, online: UNFCCC 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php>. 
Initially the fund was financed by a share of proceeds from the CDM, for the second period additional 
funds will come from a share of the proceeds of JI project emissions transfers. 
52 See e.g. Alan Boyle, “Climate Change and International Law: A Post-Kyoto Perspective” (2012) 42:6 
Envtl Pol’y & L 333 at 335.  
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In Copenhagen, at COP/15 parties to the FCCC/Kyoto hoped to close the 
emissions gap with an agreement on broader and deeper mitigation efforts. The talks 
were a failure in this regard, but did produce some important developments.53 In the 
Copenhagen Accord, parties consolidated around the objective of reducing global 
emissions in order to limit the rise in average temperature to less than 2 degrees C.54 
Recognizing a more urgent need for action, the Copenhagen Accord calls for more 
precise FCCC-party mitigation targets and timetables. Annex I parties are to 
implement quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted to 
the FCCC secretariat and published. 55  Non-Annex I parties are to implement 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions, including those submitted to the 
secretariat.56 A diverse set of quantified targets and mitigation actions has resulted, 
with many of the parties' pledges conditional on action by other countries. Annex I 
parties' pledges were largely in the form of percentage reductions in overall 
emissions relative to a base year.57 The non-Annex I parties' NAMAs were highly 
varied; voluntary pledges included commitments to reduce the intensity of emissions 
per unit of GDP (China, India),58 and to reduce emissions below projected “business 
as usual” (Brazil).59 The Copenhagen Accord also had a corresponding emphasis on 
a process to monitor the methods by which countries' efforts were measured and 
verified, to increase the transparency and rigor of all pledges.60 The Copenhagen 
53 See e.g. Meinhard Doelle, “The Copenhagen Climate Talks: The end of the Road for the UNFCC or a 
Step Forward in the Evolution of the Regime?” (2010) 2:2 Amsterdam Law Forum 71 [Doelle, 
“Copenhagen Step Forward”]; Meinhard Doelle, “The Legacy of the Climate Talks in Copenhagen: 
Hopenhagen or Brokenhagen?” (2010) 1 Carbon & Climate Law Review 86 [Doelle, “Hopenhagen”].  
54 “Copenhagen Accord” in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in 
Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December: Addendum: Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties 
at its fifteenth session, UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010) [mimeo] 4. This target allows 
for a more precise implied level of GHG emissions worldwide, and correspondingly more precise targets 
for limiting country-specific emissions, particularly for major emitters, although these figures did not form 
part of the accord. 
55 Ibid. The submitted targets can be found in Compilation of economy-wide emissions reduction targets to 
be implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention: Revised note by the secretariat, 
UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1 (2011) [mimeo] [FCCC Annex I Targets].  
56 The non-Annex I submissions can be found in  Compilation of information on nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions to be implemented by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention: Note by the 
secretariat, UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1 (2011) [mimeo] [FCCC NAMAs]. 
57 For example, Canada pledged to reduce its emissions by 17% relative to a 2005 base year by 2020, to be 
aligned with the final economy-wide target for the US “enacted in legislation.”  
58 FCCC NAMAs, supra note 56 at 11 (China), 26 (India). China’s commitment is to “endeavor” (ibid at 
11) to reduce its emissions intensity by 40-50% relative to a 2005 base year by 2020. It also pledged to 
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption and to increase forest cover. India’s similarly 
framed objective was to reduce intensity by 20-25% of a 2005 base by 2020, but agricultural emissions 
would be excluded from the calculations. 
59 Ibid at 8. Brazil specified a set of mitigation actions that it expected to reduce emissions 36.1-38.9% 
from its projected emissions in 2020. 
60 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 54 at paras 4 (Annex I parties – “[d]elivery” of emissions reductions 
and financing “will be measured, reported and verified” according to COP guidelines to ensure accounting  
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Accord also featured renewed emphasis on adaptation, including the need to assist 
developing and vulnerable states through funding, technology transfer and capacity 
building.61 While Copenhagen was a disappointment, as it was hoped it would lead 
to successful negotiations on a Kyoto successor, it did signal a shift toward increased 
need for global action, incorporating more specific commitments for all parties.62 
 
 
Parties have continued to work along these lines following on from 
Copenhagen. At COP/16 the parties adopted the Cancun Agreements, with a 
significant focus on adaptation. Parties agreed to establish an adaptation framework, 
assisting developing countries in particular with adaptation planning and 
implementation. 63  Parties continued to advance long-term financial support for 
developing country mitigation and adaptation through the Green Climate Fund, and 
through “Fast Start” financing.64 A new “Technology Mechanism” was established 
to facilitate the development and transfer of technology to aid in mitigation and 
adaptation efforts, particularly by developing countries.65  
 
 
At COP/17 the need for enhanced action on mitigation and the question of a 
successor to the Kyoto protocol took centre stage, resulting in the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action. 66 While a subset of the original Kyoto parties agreed to a 
second commitment period, the Durban Platform outlined a more general ambition to 
negotiate a protocol or other legal instrument applicable to all parties to come into 
effect for the period from 2020. 67 Motivating this development was a desire to 
strengthen the “multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention” to achieve 
is “rigorous, robust and transparent”), 5 (Non-Annex I parties – mitigation actions “subject to domestic 
measurement, reporting and verification” but with results to be communicated through National 
Communications, with “provisions for international consultations and analysis” to review these. NAMAs 
receiving support from Annex I parties subject to their more rigorous reporting guidelines.) 
61 Ibid at paras 8, 3. The Accord committed developed country parties to the provision of additional 
financial support for 2010-2012 (“fast start” financing) and established a “Green Climate Fund” that 
would provide support to developing country parties (ibid at para 10). 
62 See e.g. Boyle, supra note 52 at 335 (discussing shift in focus away from common but differentiated 
responsibilities under Copenhagen Accord). See also Daniel Bodansky, “The Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference: A Postmortem” (2010) 104:2 AJIL 230. 
63 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 
December 2010: Addendum: Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth 
session, UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011) [mimeo] [Cancun Agreements] at 4-7. 
64 Ibid at 16-17. 
65 Ibid at 18-19. 
66 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November to 
11 December, 2011: Addendum: Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
seventeenth session, UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012) [mimeo] [Durban Platform]. 
67 Ibid at 2.  
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“the widest possible cooperation by all countries” to effectively address the 
increasingly urgent emissions gap.68 COP/17 called on all parties to enhance their 
mitigation efforts under their quantified economy-wide emissions targets or NAMAs, 
and worked to increase the transparency and reliability of reported progress. 69  
Increased ambition and transparency of national actions is to set the stage for 
negotiations to advance the Durban platform. 
 
 
The Durban platform has taken on increased importance as the parties to the 
FCCC move beyond the end of Kyoto’s first commitment period in 2012.  At 
COP/18 in Doha, parties established a timetable to finalize a new universal 
agreement in 2015, to take effect by 2020. 70 Countries have continued to work 
toward this objective at COP/19.71 Parties have continued to consolidate work on 
enhanced mitigation, adaptation and reporting for all FCCC parties, as well as 
support for developing countries and vulnerable states. 72  The most recent 
development is establishment of a mechanism to provide compensation for loss and 
damage associated with extreme weather events and slow onset effects of climate 
change in the most vulnerable states.73 
 
 
The international climate regime is approaching a critical point in its 
evolution and it is unclear exactly what form, if any, a new universal instrument will 
take in 2015. The regime has continued to provide normative recognition of the 
threat posed by climate change and the need for collective action to address it. Thus 
far developing countries remain expected to “take the lead” in mitigation efforts. 
However, there is increased emphasis on the need for action by all countries, and 
major developing country emitters including China and India now appear more 
willing to adopt measures to curb emissions. The international regime appears to be 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at 4-14. 
70 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 
December 2012: Addendum: Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its eighteenth 
session, UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (2013) [mimeo] [Doha Decisions].   
71  “Further advancing the Durban Platform” in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth 
session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013: Addendum: Part two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its nineteenth session, UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (2014) 
[mimeo] 3; see also United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Press Release, “UN Climate Change 
Conference in Warsaw keeps governments on a track towards 2015 climate agreement” (23 November 
2013) [Warsaw COP/19 Press Release] online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int>.  
72 Access to the most recent related decisions of COP/19 can be found at: 
http://unfccc.int/2860.php#decisions.  
73 See Doha Decisions, supra note 70 at 21-24 (decision to establish mechanism at COP/19); “Warsaw 
international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts” in UNFCCC, supra 
note 71, 6.  
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evolving toward a model that incorporates mitigation targets and timetables for all 
parties. Corresponding work on measurement and reporting under the international 
regime will increase the reliability of these targets and evaluation of countries’ 
progress in their implementation.74 The international regime is likely to continue 
incorporating flexibility mechanisms to encourage cooperation, cost-effective 
mitigation, and to leverage developing country support for mitigation action in 
developing countries. 75  Although adaptation has always been a part of the 
international climate regime, it has taken on increased prominence, particularly in 
light of the growing emissions gap.  
 
 
The international climate regime has attracted almost universal state 
participation. Its ongoing operation provides a broad-based consensus recognizing 
climate change as a global threat requiring global action. While the regime has yet to 
provide particularly effective outcomes in terms of climate change mitigation, it is 
establishing a normative obligation on states to take action. Through its processes for 
collecting and disseminating information about states’ actions, the international 
regime helps promote transparency and accountability for state choices in the 
international context. While the internal legal mechanisms for enforcement are 
relatively weak, the same cannot necessarily be said for the pressure the climate 
regime may produce in a global political context. 
 
 
CLIMATE LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA: THEME AND VARIATIONS 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Canada has been involved in the international climate regime since its inception. 
Canada was one of the initial signatories to the UN FCCC as an Annex I party, and 
ratified the Convention in 1992. 76  Canada also was among the first group of 
signatories to the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, ratifying the Protocol in 2002, so was 
subject to international obligations under the Protocol during the time it was in force, 
until its withdrawal in December 2012. 77 However, the existence of obligations 
under international law does not answer the question of how the international climate 
regime has been domesticated in Canada. 
74 See Doelle, “Hopenhagen”, supra note 53 at 97-98 (discussing role of monitoring and verification, 
importance for effective post-Kyoto agreement).  
75 Parties to Kyoto have expressed concern that any new instrument continue support for emissions trading 
and other Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. Parties to the FCCC have reiterated support for continued use of 
market mechanisms to promote achievement of the Convention objectives, see e.g. Doha Decisions, supra 
note 70 at 8-10. 
76 For information on ratification status of countries under the UN FCCC, see UNFCCC “Status of 
Ratification of the Convention”, online: UNFCCC 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php>.  
77 For information on ratification status of countries under the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC, see UNFCCC, 
"Status of Ratification of the Convention”, supra note 5.   
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 While Canadian law establishes the prerogative of the federal executive to 
undertake international obligations for Canada, their incorporation into Canada’s 
domestic law is subject to the allocation of authority under the Division of Powers.78 
At times the Supreme Court has taken a generous approach to federal competence in 
the implementation of national environmental legislation. 79 The decision in R v 
Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd80 upheld the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act81 
despite its intrusion into provincial competence over internal marine waters, in part 
recognizing it as the fulfillment of Canada’s obligations under the London Dumping 
Convention.82 While the case remains a leading authority on the potential scope of 
federal power under its “peace, order and good government” jurisdiction, a vigorous 
dissent by Justice LaForest cautioned against recognizing a general federal power to 
legislate in relation to the environment.83 This position was subsequently endorsed in 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport)84 which held 
that the environment was a “diffuse subject” that did not fit neatly within the existing 
division of powers. Both levels of government have potential jurisdiction in relation 
to “environmental” matters, depending on the alignment of the particular subject 
matter with the division of powers. 
 
 
The obligations under international climate law for Canada involve a 
potentially large and varied set of actions, ranging from the raising and spending of 
money to meet financial obligations, to formulating domestic law and policy to 
achieve emissions mitigation, to measurement and reporting on emissions and 
mitigation. The set of policy actions in Article 2.1 of the Kyoto Protocol illustrate the 
78 The foundational authority is the Canada (AG) v Ontario (AG), [1937] A.C. 326, (sub nom Reference 
Re Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, Minimum Wages Act and Limitations of Hours of Work 
Act) [1937] 1 WWR 299. 
79 In addition to Crown Zellerbach, infra note 80, the Court took a flexible approach to federal criminal 
law jurisdiction to uphold the toxic substance provisions under the Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act, RSC 1985, c 16 (4th Supp), despite their complex, regulatory features, in R v Hydro Quebec, [1997] 3 
SCR 213, 151 DLR (4th) 32 [Hydro Quebec cited to SCR]. For discussion of the generous approach to 
federal environmental regulation and its contribution to national values, see e.g Jean Leclair, “The 
Supreme Court, the Environment, and the Construction of National Identity” (1998) 4 Rev Const Stud 
372-378. 
80 [1988] 1 SCR 401, 49 DLR (4th) 161 [Crown Zellerbach, cited to SCR]. 
81 SC 1974-75-76, c 55. 
82 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matters, 29 
December, 1972, 1046 UNTS 120, 11 ILM 1294. 
83 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 80 at paras 70-71. 
84 [1992] 1 SCR 3, 88 DLR (4th) 1 [Friends of the Oldman, cited to SCR].  
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reach of activity linked to climate change.85 Like the environment, “climate change” 
is a multifaceted, diffuse subject that incorporates matters that can be assigned to 
various heads of jurisdiction under the Division of Powers. As a result, the 
incorporation of international climate law in Canada is a “joint production” of the 
federal and provincial governments. As will be seen below, governments have varied 
in their ambitions and response to climate change, with the result being an uneven 
penetration of international climate law and its norms in Canada.  
 
 
1.  Federal Climate Action 
  
Canada’s federal government has been equivocal in its enthusiasm for the 
international climate regime.86 While initially a strong supporter of the FCCC and 
Kyoto, more recently the federal government has cooled on the international regime, 
taking the position that it is simply not in Canada’s interests to adhere to its Kyoto 
commitment.87 The current federal approach to the international regime reflects a 
rationalist, interest-based account of the influence of international law. Canada’s 
participation and compliance are premised on the international regime imposing 
“meaningful and transparent” mitigation commitments on all major emitters, and on 
balancing environmental goals with economic priorities.88 This approach, combined 
with Canada’s Kyoto withdrawal, suggests that the power of the international climate 
regime is limited. However, even at the federal level, one can see the influence of the 
international climate regime.  
 
 
Despite their pragmatic “irrationality”, Canada has followed the prompts of 
the international climate regime in adopting quantified GHG mitigation targets and 
timetables. The federal executive bound Canada to an ambitious target at Kyoto.89 
The Kyoto target was likely unrealistic for Canada from the outset, but was in line 
with the proposed targets for other major Annex B parties 90  and perhaps was 
intended to signal Canada’s cooperative potential more generally. 91  During the 
85 Recall that the list ranges from increased energy efficiency, transportation sector improvements, forest 
and agricultural policy, to market measures, and investments in research and new technology. 
86 See Glenn & Otero, supra note 6 at 489 (discussing variation in Federal government position on Kyoto). 
87 Ibid at 500. 
88 See Government of Canada, Canada’s Priorities at COP 19 [COP 19 Prioritites], online: Canada’s 
Action on Climate Change <http://climatechange.gc.ca>. 
89 See e.g. Jeffrey Simpson, Mark Jaccard & Nic Rivers, Hot Air: Meeting Canada’s Climate Change 
Challenge (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007) at 249-250 (Kyoto commitment based on moral 
voluntarism over rational analysis). 
90 See Glenn & Otero, supra note 6 at 495 (US 7%, EU 8% targets, compared with Canada’s Kyoto pledge 
of 6%). 
91 See e.g. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 7 at 122-124 (signaling reputation for cooperativeness).  
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period in which Canada was a party to Kyoto, the federal government adopted its 
Kyoto target and commitment period as the ostensible guide for its mitigation 
actions.92 Despite ultimately rejecting Kyoto, the federal government has continued 
to adhere to the international regime’s emerging norm of specifying a quantified 
economy-wide mitigation target, promising a 17% reduction in emissions relative to 
a 2005 base as part of its adoption of the Copenhagen Accord.93 This goal was highly 
influenced by the U.S. target, incorporating explicit matching into the Copenhagen 
pledge itself. Federal adherence to the international regime norm of setting targets 
and timetables for mitigation reflects the need to signal cooperative behavior in the 
international setting, as well as a need to protect national interests through 
coordination. Behind the US alignment of Canada’s policy were fears of possible US 
trade measures unless equivalent climate change mitigation actions were adopted.94 
The ability to influence developing country parties to adopt binding emissions 
restraints also depends on a demonstration of commitment by developed parties.95 
While Canada’s record of attaining its targets is weak, the influence of the 
international climate regime is reflected in Canada’s continued adoption of 
benchmarks.96 
 
 
The influence of the international climate regime is also reflected in federal 
efforts to implement reporting obligations under the international climate regime, 
including preparation of national GHG inventory data, projected emissions, and 
National Communications. 97  The federal government has also produced various 
policy documents outlining plans for compliance with its international climate 
92 But see Glenn & Otero, supra note 6 at 498-504 (suggesting that while Kyoto target was early 
benchmark, since 2006 federal government has “avoided” Kyoto target, adopted other (more lenient) 
targets in its policy and regulations). 
93 See e.g. Environment Canada, Canada’s Emission Trends, (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2013) [Emissions 
Trends 2013] at 1, online: Government of Canada Publications <http://publications.gc.ca>. 
94 See e.g. Dennis Mahoney, ed, The Law of Climate Change in Canada, loose-leaf (consulted on ), 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2013) [Mahoney Reporter], ch 4 at 54, 76-77. 
95 See e.g. Doelle, “Hopenhagen”, supra note 53 at 95-96 (discussing link between developed, developing 
country mitigation pledges, inadequacy of both at Copenhagen relative to required global effort). 
96 See Jeffrey Simpson, “Ottawa denies its own emissions stats”, The Globe & Mail (1 November 2013) 
A17 (noting Canada’s repeated failure to meet announced targets, including likely failure to meet 
Copenhagen pledge).  
97 See Environment Canada, Fifth National Communication on Climate Change: Actions to Meet 
Commitments Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (Ottawa: 
Environment Canada, 2010) [National Communication 5] at 33-39, online: Government of Canada 
Publications <http://publications.gc.ca>, for discussion of institutional arrangements for preparation of 
Inventory, assigning primary responsibility to Environment Canada, under the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33. This same information is repeated in the most recent update, 
Environment Canada, Canada’s Sixth National Report on Climate Change 2014, (Ottawa: Environment 
Canada, 2013) [National Communication 6] at 42-46, online: Government of Canada Publications 
<http://publications.gc.ca>.  
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change obligations.98 In combination with Canada’s explicit adoption of targets and 
timetables for mitigation under the international regime, the federal government’s 
reporting has increased the transparency of Canada’s efforts. This combination has 
exposed Canada’s lack of progress, creating an implementation gap that has fueled 
criticism in both the domestic and international context. The reported projections of 
oil industry contributions to Canada’s GHG emissions and the implications for 
Canada’s ability to meet mitigation obligations had led to international pressure from 
the US and the EU. In the US there are threats to block approval for the Keystone XL 
Pipeline, and in the EU a proposed fuel quality directive could impose a penalty on 
oil-sands fuel.99 Domestically, recent polling data suggests emerging public concern 
over the federal government’s failure to implement effective climate mitigation 
strategies.100 Both developments are suggestive of a role for the international climate 
regime in influencing public opinion, producing political pressure for Canada to 
come up to the benchmarks it has committed to in the international regime.101  
 
 
 To date, the federal government’s own efforts to implement domestic law 
and policy to further Canada’s international climate mitigation goals have been 
restrained. In part this may be explained by the diverse nature of the activities that 
contribute to emissions levels, making it challenging to construct comprehensive 
federal regulation that would respect the Division of Powers. 102  This is not an 
entirely satisfactory explanation, as the federal government has eschewed the use of 
policy measures within its jurisdiction, such as a federal carbon tax.103 However, 
98 See e.g. Glenn and Otero, supra note 6 at 496-500 (discussing climate change plans adopted by federal 
government, role of opposition parties in establishing reporting architecture for government’s 
implementation of Kyoto obligations). 
99 See Shawn McCarthy, “Oil sands production creates ‘challenge’ as emissions rise”, The Globe & Mail 
(5 November 2013) B3. 
100 See Shawn McCarthy & Richard Blackwell, “Canadians want Harper government to take leadership 
role on climate change, poll says”, The Globe & Mail (6 November 2013) online: The Globe and Mail 
<http://theglobeandmail.com> (climate change should be a top priority for federal government, majority 
give government poor marks for its performance, favour participation in international treaty regime). 
101 This effect tracks theories of international law’s influence developed by Linos, supra note 10, 
Simmons, supra note 11. 
102 See e.g. Alastair Lucas & Jenette Yearsley, “The Constitutionality of Federal Climate Change 
Legislation” (2012) 23:3 J Envtl L & Prac 205, discussing proposed federal 2006 Clean Air Bill, that 
would have set up a national cap for GHG emissions under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
suggesting it would not have been constitutional. Note that other authors have suggested that federal 
powers such as criminal law (91(27)) or trade and commerce (91(2)) or POGG might support more 
general climate regulation, including cap and trade regulation of GHG, at the federal level, see e.g. Peter 
Hogg, “Constitutional Authority over Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (2009) 46:2 Alta L Rev 507; Stewart 
Elgie, “Kyoto, the Constitution, and Carbon Trading: Waking a Sleeping BNA Bear (or Two)” (2007) 
13:1 Rev Const Stud 67; Philip Barton, “Economic Instruments & the Kyoto Protocol: Can Parliament 
Implement Emissions Trading without Provincial Co-operation?” (2002) 40:2 Alta L Rev 417. 
103 See e.g. Shi-Ling Hsu & Robin Elliot, “Regulating Greenhouse Gases in Canada: Constitutional and 
Policy Dimensions” (2009) 54:3 McGill LJ 463 at 489 (federal carbon tax constitutional); Thomas  
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proposing new environmental taxes has proven to be a risky political strategy at the 
federal level. 104  The federal government has instead targeted specific sectors, 
introducing command and control standards geared to achieving intensity-based 
targets for GHG emissions reductions. 
 
 
The potential influence of international law can be seen in Canada’s choice 
of sectoral policy initiatives. Canada’s choice to regulate the transportation and 
electricity sector align with the Kyoto mitigation policy exemplars, lending 
normative support to these actions as legitimate mitigation efforts.105 The role of the 
international regime as a prospective means of cross-country policy coordination is 
also discernible. Canada’s sectoral initiatives are aligned with EPA efforts in the 
US.106 Although the US has not ratified Kyoto, international climate law and science 
have helped mobilize public pressure for GHG regulations, particularly in California, 
the state leading the US sectoral GHG initiatives.107  
 
 
The first set of federal regulations focus on the transportation sector, a 
significant contributor to Canada’s overall emissions.108 The federal government has 
put in place regulations imposing emissions standards for passenger cars and light 
trucks, for model years 2011-2016 (LDV 1).109 It has published final versions of 
similar proposed regulations for model years 2017-2025 (LDV 2). 110  These 
regulations, aligned with US standards, impose increasingly stringent restrictions on 
Courchene, “Climate Change, Competitiveness and Environmental Federalism: The Case for a Carbon 
Tax” (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2008). 
104 Stephan Dion’s “Green Shift” platform incorporating such a tax preceded the poor showing of the 
liberals in the 2008 election and his resignation as party leader. 
105 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 32, art 2(1). Canada has pointed to its transportation and electricity 
sector regulations in its public communications on national mitigation actions, see e.g. “Facts on Canada’s 
Climate Change Action” available at: 
http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=72F16A84-1 [Fast Facts]. 
106 See Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94, ch 4 at 61-62.  
107 Ibid, ch 4 at 62 (California benchmark for transportation regulations), 59 (coordination with US EPA 
Stationary Source regulations re electricity sector GHG emissions). See also Courchene, supra note 103 at 
3 (role of California in driving Canadian regulations). The EPA’s regulation in both these sectors was 
initiated following a successful lawsuit brought by a group of 12 states and various environmental 
organizations, arguing that GHG emissions were “air pollutants” under the US Clean Air Act; see 
Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497 (2007) [Massachusetts v EPA]. 
108 See Emissions Trends 2013, supra note 93 at 21. In 2011 Transportation accounted for 170 Megatons 
(Mt) of Carbon equivalent emissions (CO2e) out of Canada’s total emissions of 702 Mt. 
109 Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2010-201 [LDV 1 
Regs]. 
110 Regulations Amending the Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Regulations, (2012) C Gaz I, 3263 [LDV 2 Regs].   
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emissions. They are projected to improve the fuel efficiency of passenger cars by 
41% relative to 2010 models and by 37% for light trucks. The result will be an 
estimated reduction of emissions in Canada by 9-10 Mt up to 2016, with an 
additional reduction of 3 Mt by 2020.111 Similar regulations have been introduced for 
heavy-duty vehicles, also aligned with US standards (HDV).112 These regulations are 
projected to improve fuel efficiency and achieve a reduction in emissions of 19Mt.113 
These regulations are complemented by Renewable Fuels Regulations requiring a 
5% renewable fuel content in gasoline and 2% renewable content in diesel fuel.114 
However, emissions for the transportation sector overall are still projected to increase 
by 2020 to a total of 176 Mt of CO2 equivalent emissions.115  
 
 
The second set of regulations target the energy sector, also a significant 
contributor to Canada’s overall emissions. 116  Here the federal government has 
introduced regulations for electricity production, imposing a cap on emissions 
intensity from coal fired plants, unless additional emissions are offset through viable 
carbon capture and storage.117 These federal efforts also track US EPA regulations 
for GHG emissions in the electricity sector.118 The regulations are to come into effect 
in 2015 and the objective is to “foster a permanent transition towards lower or non-
emitting” means of energy production.119 In combination with provincial policies, 
the estimated effect is to reduce emissions from coal fired plants by 41 Mt. This 
reduction is expected to be partially offset by increased emissions from natural gas 
fired plants, but overall emissions from electricity production should still drop by 
about 30 Mt by 2020.120 
 
 
While the federal government has thus targeted two key sectors, both the 
effects and the scope of its mitigation initiatives are relatively modest. In both cases, 
the measures adopted by the federal regulation impose intensity-based measures to 
111 See Emissions Trends 2013, supra note 93 at 22. 
112 Heavy Duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Regulations, (2012) C Gaz I, 920 [HDV Regs].  
113 Ibid, see “Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement” accompanying the regulations. 
114 See National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 58. 
115 Emission Trends, supra note 93 at 22.  
116 Ibid at 21. In 2011 the Energy sector (Oil and Gas and Electricity combined) accounted for 253 Mt 
CO2e emissions out of Canada’s total emissions of 702 Mt. 
117 Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of Electricity Regulations, 
SOR/2012-167, ss 3(1) (limit), 9 (exemption for carbon capture & storage). 
118 See Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94, ch 4 at 59. 
119 Emissions Trends 2013, supra note 93 at 28. 
120 Ibid at 30.  
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curb emissions (e.g. cap on emissions per mile travelled / unit of energy production), 
rather than involving a fixed cap on emissions. The effect of the policies in terms of 
overall emissions thus remains uncertain. As yet, the federal government has not 
attempted to regulate the oil and gas sector, particularly oil sands production. This 
sector is expected to make the dominant contribution to Canada’s projected 
emissions growth, wiping out any anticipated emissions reductions from the 
electricity sector.121 The federal government has also not taken the lead to develop 
national mechanisms that would facilitate flexible implementation of Canada’s 
international climate targets, such as an emissions trading system. Land Use, Land 
Use Change and Forestry actions will form a major component of Canada’s projected 
emissions reductions in 2020.122 While the federal government has been active in 
creating new national parks, particularly in the North, these are not the main 
contributors to projected LULUCF emissions reductions.123 They are largely driven 
by sharp declines in forestry harvesting following the economic downturn in 2008.124 
 
 
In addition to its sectoral regulations, the federal government has adopted 
“[s]trategic [i]nvestment” as a significant component of its mitigation strategy.125 In 
line with guidance under the Kyoto Protocol, it has invested in programs to increase 
energy efficiency and develop sources of alternative energy production, 126 made 
substantial investments directed at developing viable carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technology, 127  and through its “Sustainable Development Technology 
Canada” (STSC) program is supporting projects developing sustainable 
technologies. 128  These investments are in line with the guidance for mitigation 
121 Ibid at 25, Oil Sands production is expected to increase emissions by 67 Mt of CO2 by 2020. 
122 Ibid at 34, the LULUCF sector is expected to remove 28 Mt CO2e by 2020. 
123 Reference to Canada’s creation of new parks features in its statement, COP 19 Priorities, supra note 
88.  For a list of National Parks and lands included in National Reserves (lands set aside to be converted 
into parks pending negotiation of outstanding aboriginal claims) by date, see Parks Canada, “Canada’s 
National Parks & Reserves”, online: Parks Canada <http://www.pc.gc.ca/eng/docs/v-
g/nation/nation103.aspx>.   
124 Emissions Trends 2013, supra note 93 at 42. 
125 See Fast Facts, supra note 105; see also National Communication 5, supra note 97 at 45-49 discussing 
various federal investments and initiatives to 2010.  
126 See e.g. National Communication 5, ibid at 45, discussing ecoEnergy programs investing in a range of 
projects to increase energy efficiency and develop alternative energy supply. See also more concise 
discussion of these programs in National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 60-62. The energy efficiency 
investments were complemented with regulations under the Energy Efficiency Act to strengthen minimum 
energy performance standards for many products, such as household appliances, and requiring 
“EnerGuide” labeling to make energy requirements transparent, (ibid at 59). 
127 See Fast Facts, supra note 105, indicating that in the last 5 years the federal government has committed 
over $500 million to such initiatives. 
128 For a review of recent projects, see Sustainable Development Technology Canada, Media Release, 
“Backgrounder – Projects - $14 million in funding” (12 September 2013) online: SDTC  
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actions under the international regime. The substantial investments in CCS 
undoubtedly own much to the pressure for GHG emissions reduction generated by 
the international climate regime. In light of the looming contribution to Canada’s 
overall emissions from oil sands development, technological change to reduce the 
impact from this sector is highly desirable, but it is unclear whether federal 
investments will produce results. 
 
 
As with the international regime, until recently the primary focus of federal 
climate policy has been mitigation, rather than adaptation.129 However, more recently 
policy has shifted toward addressing adaptation as climate science has become more 
certain and the effects of climate change more apparent. Investment is the primary 
climate adaptation policy; the federal government renewed funding for adaptation 
investments in 2011, allocating $148 million over 5 years. 130 This funding was 
directed at a range of projects, including support for climate change prediction and 
scenario development, funding for heat alert and response systems, assistance for 
fisheries aquatic climate adaptation research, and a suite of programs directed at 
promoting adaptation and resilience to climate change in Canada’s Northern 
communities. The largest individual investment of $35 Million supported Natural 
Resources Canada’s program directed at “Enhancing Competitiveness in a Changing 
Climate.”131 The federal government’s adaptation investments appear to be primarily 
directed at achieving a better understanding of the likely impacts of climate change, 
and providing information so that provincial and municipal governments, and private 
actors can make informed decisions about adaptation. Its specific focus on Northern 
adaptation recognizes that this is a region where climate risks are particularly urgent. 
The increased focus on adaptation support, particularly for vulnerable Northern 
communities, is in line with the increased priority for adaptation under the 
international regime. 
 
 
In addition to the impacts on domestic measures to address climate change, 
the international climate regime spurs action by the federal government to assist 
developing countries. Although the international regime offers flexible mechanisms 
to assist developing countries, financial support is the primary federal approach. The 
federal government has allocated funds for its Copenhagen commitments to provide 
<http://www.sdtc.ca>. Recent projects include research to develop cleaner processes for bitumen 
extraction, cleaner “scrubbers” for emissions management, a new technology for pesticide to reduce 
amounts and increase effectiveness, and a new technology to facilitate integration of small-scale electricity 
generation into the grid.  
129 See Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 4-69. 
130 See Environment Canada, “Backgrounder – Canada’s Ongoing Commitment to Climate Change 
Adaptation” (2013), online: Government of Canada <http://ec.gc.ca>. Its initial adaptation funding in 
2007 was for $85.9 million over 4 years. 
131 Ibid.  
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additional financial support for developing and vulnerable countries to assist with 
mitigation and adaptation. 132  Through this funding, Canada supported projects 
including improved weather forecasting, support for agricultural resilience and food 
security, and development of protected areas to promote climate resilience in the 
most vulnerable countries.133 Canada also provided funding to the FCCC Climate 
Technology Center Network (CTCN) established under the Cancun Agreements to 
support technology development and transfer, as well as working through 
multilateral organizations to spur private support.134 The federal government has also 
supported the development of technology that can be shared with developing 
countries, and other parties. 135  While the federal government is resistant to the 
incorporation of distributive considerations into “common but differentiated” 
mitigation obligations for parties to the international climate regime, it is more 
receptive to providing adaptation support for developing countries.  
 
 
The federal government’s climate policy acknowledges Canada’s 
obligations under international climate law and, to an extent, responds to these 
obligations. Canada meets its procedural obligations to generate and report on its 
GHG inventories, projected emissions, and provide the required national 
communications. This makes Canada’s actions and progress in relation to its 
substantive international climate law commitments relatively transparent. 
Unfortunately, while the federal government has committed to clear targets and 
timetables to reduce emissions, its own actions to mitigate climate change are modest 
and their projected impact too weak. In its most recent National Communication, the 
federal government admits that reaching the Copenhagen pledge could be 
“challenging.” 136  This is an understatement based on the information in the 
Communication, which projects Canada’s 2020 emissions at 734 Mt, compared with 
its Copenhagen target of 612 Mt.137 While Canada’s emissions are determined by a 
combination of federal, provincial and private action, to date the concrete measures 
adopted by the federal government to advance the ultimate objective of the FCCC 
are ineffective. Canada is likely to renege on its current pledge under the 
international climate regime going into negotiations for a new instrument under the 
132 See National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 144-145, 148. See also, Government of Canada, 
Canada’s Fast Start Financing: Delivering on our Copenhagen Commitment (2013), online: United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
<https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/cop_fsf_canada_2013_e
n.pdf> for a detailed discussion of the programs supported. 
133 Ibid at 4-6. 
134 See National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 151. 
135 Ibid at 159-160. Examples include models for forest sector carbon budgets, and infrastructure 
engineering vulnerability assessment. 
136 Ibid at 7. 
137 Ibid at 7-9.  
                                                        
108 UNB LJ     RD UN-B   [VOL/TOME 65] 
  
Durban Platform. The federal government’s weak implementation of its mitigation 
obligations is a significant contributing factor.  
 
 
Canada has made some progress and in its Communication stresses that its 
measures (including those of the provinces) will result in a trajectory that sees 2020 
emissions 128 Mt less than a business as usual scenario, and result in reductions in 
emissions intensity.138 This measurement of progress tracks the approach taken by 
many developing countries under the international regime, and perhaps reflects a 
common concern with undertaking climate mitigation actions where the economic 
consequences are too severe.139 The federal government’s position at recent COPs 
has been that a “fair” new agreement is needed, that imposes binding restrictions on 
all major emitters, in order for Canada to undertake significant emissions 
reductions.140 There is certainly an economic logic to holding back on costly national 
action when lack of commitment by other parties would make any emissions 
reductions futile. As noted earlier, Canada’s substantive (non)compliance with its 
mitigation commitments reflects the view that international law is limited in the 
extent it can force countries to act contrary to their perceived interests. In Canada’s 
case, the federal perception is that implementing Canada’s short-term obligations is 
simply too costly. Canada’s federal government has taken actions to fulfill other 
obligations under the international regime, including providing support for domestic 
and international adaptation, technology development and transfer, and provision of 
financial support. However, the approach to the key action of domestic mitigation is 
out of step with the norms of the international regime. 
 
 
2.  Provincial Climate Law & Policy 
 
Canada’s climate law and policy is determined through the combined efforts of the 
federal and provincial / territorial governments. Although they do not have any direct 
obligations under the international climate regime, Canada’s provinces and territories 
have all taken steps to address the challenge of climate change. However, the extent 
to which these efforts reflect international climate law varies considerably. In this 
section, I will examine provincial law and policy in light of key aspects of the 
international regime to illustrate the diversity at this sub-national level.141 
 
 
138 Ibid at 8. 
139 Ibid at 17, discussing importance of energy and natural resource industries in Canada’s economy, role 
of Canada as net energy exporter. 
140 See COP 19 Priorities, supra note 88. 
141 The review of provincial / territorial law and policy will be selective; a comprehensive review of all 
climate law and policy at this level is beyond the scope of the paper.  
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As seen above, mitigation is a central obligation under both the FCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol, with the international climate regime moving toward quantified 
emission reductions targets and timetables, especially for developed participants. In 
general, the climate law and policy of Canada’s provinces and territories incorporates 
this mitigation norm and the targets and timetables approach of the international 
regime.  
 
 
All provinces have climate change emissions targets with associated 
timelines.142 Several provinces have common emissions reduction targets, adopted as 
part of regional climate initiatives. British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec 
along with US states, including California, are members of the Western Climate 
Initiative which has a regional target of a 15% reduction below 2005 levels by 
2020.143 New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, P.E.I. and Newfoundland & Labrador are 
participants in the New England Governors / Eastern Canadian Premiers Climate 
Change Action Plan, which has a shared voluntary target to reduce regional 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, 10% below 1990 by 2020 and sets a long term 
target of 75-85% below 1990 by 2050.144 Provinces have also adopted their own 
targets either in addition to, or independently of these regional initiatives. British 
Columbia has targets to reduce emissions 33% from a 2007 base by 2020, with an 
interim reduction of 6% reduction by 2012 and 18% by 2016, with a long-term goal 
of an 80% reduction by 2050.145 These targets are enshrined in legislation, in the 
Greenhouse Gas Reductions Target Act, SBC 2007, c. 42. Manitoba has also 
legislated emissions reduction targets of 6% below 1990 levels by 2012 in the 
Manitoba Climate Change and Emissions Reduction Act, C.C.S.M. c. C135. 
Quebec’s 2013-2020 Climate Change Action Plan adopts an ambitious target to 
reduce emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020.146  
 
 
142 See National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 63-74. 
143 Ibid at 63. For access to the WCI partners’ individual climate action plans, see “Partner Climate Action 
Plans” (2013), online: Western Climate Initiative <http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org>. 
144 Ibid at 64. For details of the regional initiative, see The Committee on the Environment and the 
Northeast International Committee on Energy of the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern 
Canadian Premiers, “Climate Change Action Plan” (2001), online: The New England Governors’ 
Conference, Inc <http://negc.org/uploads/file/Reports/ClimateChangeAP%5B1%5D.pdf>.   
145 Ibid at 72. Access to B.C.’s legislative and regulatory measures implementing its targets and climate 
change action measures can be found at Ministry of Environment, “Legislation & Regulations” (2013), 
online: The Province of British Columbia <http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/cas/legislation/>. 
146 Ibid at 67. For access to details of Quebec’s plan, see Government of Quebec, “2013-2020 Climate 
Change Action Plan” (2012), online: Ministère du Développement durable, de l'Environnement, de la 
Faune et des Parcs <http://www.mddefp.gouv.qc.ca/changements/plan_action/pacc2020-en.pdf> [Quebec 
Action Plan 2013]. Note that the plan sets out the goal above of 20% reduction by 2020, while Canada’s 
National Communication 6 indicates a goal of 25%.  
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Provinces vary in their ambitions and also in the extent to which they have 
taken up targets and timetables as legal requirements, rather than aspects of plans or 
policies. Provinces have pursued a targets and timetables approach, even though 
federal ambiguity toward implementing Canada’s international targets became 
apparent shortly after Kyoto came into force.147 Provincial targets generally meet or 
exceed Canada’s current Copenhagen pledge, and for the most part, provinces with 
targets are on track to achieving their interim goals.148 Provincial mitigation goals 
generally reflect the form of the international climate regime’s Annex I targets, 
adopting absolute reductions from a base year as the general metric, with many 
provinces adopting targets that incorporate the 1990 Kyoto base year.149 The long-
term reductions in the 70-80% range also track the international climate regime’s 
guidance regarding the reductions needed to ensure prevention of dangerous climate 
interference.  
 
 
Alberta provides the notable exception to this theme. Alberta regulates 
emissions and has a Climate Change Action Plan. However, its target takes the form 
of a reduction in GHG emissions from a Business as Usual (BAU) baseline.150 If 
successful, Alberta projects that this will result in a reduction of 14% below 2005 
levels, but only by 2050. This is a considerably weaker target than other provinces 
have adopted, and incorporates increasing overall emissions until 2035. The form of 
the target, reduction from a BAU baseline, is generally reserved for developing 
country parties under the international regime. As currently set out in its projections, 
the bulk of Alberta’s GHG reductions from the BAU baseline are to come from 
implementing carbon capture and storage.151 Failure to develop this technology will 
imply emissions much closer to the BAU baseline. 
 
 
Theories of the influence of international law can potentially help explain 
both the adoption of mitigation targets and timetables by all the provinces, and the 
147 See Canada & Kyoto, supra note 6 at 500. 
148 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 64-74. 
149 Other provinces with similarly structured targets include Ontario, and recently Saskatchewan, which 
anticipates proclaiming legislation in 2013 to facilitate its target of 20% below a 2006 base by 2020, see 
Ministry of Environment, “Climate Change” (2013), online: Government of Saskatchewan 
<http://www.environment.gov.sk.ca>. 
150 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 71. For details of Alberta’s plan and a gateway to relevant 
documents, see Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, “Climate Change Strategy” (2014), 
online: Government of Alberta <http://esrd.alberta.ca/focus/alberta-and-climate-change/climate-change-
strategy/default.aspx>.  
 
151 Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, “Implementing Carbon Capture and Storage” 
(2014), online: Government of Alberta <http://esrd.alberta.ca/focus/alberta-and-climate-change/climate-
change-strategy/implementing-carbon-capture-and-storage.aspx>.  
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variation across these goals. The provinces’ choices reflect the role of international 
law both as a normative benchmark, and as a mechanism for coordination and 
cooperation. For example, British Columbia’s ambitious targets are supported by 
strong public belief in the threat of anthropogenic climate change.152 The political 
feasibility of B.C.’s policy, as well as its content, have been substantially influenced 
by the earlier adoption of similar climate policy initiatives in California. 153  
California’s leadership was prompted by failure of the U.S. federal government to 
take steps under the international regime.154 California’s climate change action has 
not only helped reinforce the normative desirability of similar policy, but also helped 
to drive potential for coordinated regional actions, like the Western Climate 
Initiative. The Canadian provinces with ambitious targets and timetables have 
generally been influenced by geographically proximate states that have acted as US 
climate change leaders, reacting to U.S. federal failure to act under the international 
climate regime.155 These provinces also share strong public belief in the threat of 
climate change, 156 public support for government action, 157 and commitment to 
international climate law.158  
 
 
Provinces have also acted strategically to preserve their own interests in the 
shadow of the emerging international climate regime.159 Albertans are not strong 
believers in climate change,160 and Alberta was the only provinces with majority 
152 See Mario Canseco, “Less Than Half in U.S. and Britain Believe in Man-Made Climate Change” (April 
2013), online: Angus Reid Public Opinion <http://www.angusreidglobal.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/2013.04.12_Climate.pdf> [Angus Reid 2013]. 
153 See Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 5-18-5-19. 
154 Ibid. 
155 See e.g. participation of Atlantic provinces in joint initiative with New England states, including 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont, lead petitioners in the landmark case Massachusetts v 
Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497 (2007) attempting to force the US EPA to regulate GHG 
emissions. 
156 See e.g. Canada 2020, “National Survey of Canadian and American Public Opinion on Climate 
Change” (2013) online: Canada 2020 <http://www.canada2020.ca/climatepoll/docs/Cross_Tabs-
Canada_2020_U_of_M_Climate_Poll.pdf>. 
157 See e.g. The Environics Institute / David Suzuki Foundation, “Focus Canada 2013: Canadian Public 
Opinion about Climate Change” (2013) online: David Suzuki Foundation 
<http://www.davidsuzuki.org/media/news/downloads/Focus%20Canada%202013%20-
%20Canadian%20public%20opinion%20about%20climate%20change.pdf> [Environics/David Suzuki 
2013]. 
158 See e.g. “Canadians’ Stance on the Kyoto Accord” Public Policy Landscape 17 (2002) 28, online: 
Ipsos <http://www.ipsos.ca/common/dl/pdf/tr/publicpolicylandscape1102.pdf>, at 29 [Ipsos Kytoto 2002]. 
159 Discussion that follows focuses on Alberta, but this argument applies to other provinces as well. For 
example, in adopting coordinated targets and timetables with US states under Western Climate Initiative, 
Ontario first determined that US climate change based emissions standards would not harm the province’s 
critical auto manufacturing sector, see Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 9-33. 
160 See Angus Reid 2013, supra note 152.  
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public opinion opposing Kyoto implementation.161 Nevertheless, the province has 
embarked on climate change mitigation efforts, recognizing that the broader 
international commitment to limit GHG emissions will have market implications for 
its major product – fossil fuels.162 Enhanced reporting and transparency under the 
international climate regime have made the Alberta’s oil industry’s GHG emissions 
profile increasingly visible, and it has been the focus of international public pressure 
that threatens access to export markets.163 The province has resisted adopting policy 
targets of absolute reductions in GHG emissions in the form of Kyoto / Copenhagen 
commitments, as the implications for the provincial economy are regarded as too 
severe.164 However, the province’s targets do mirror the approach taken by non-
Annex I countries that are large emitters, such as China, which may help secure their 
legitimacy. Alberta has clearly recognized that although full compliance with 
international climate regime targets is too costly for its economy in the short run, the 
emerging international pressure for GHG mitigation demands a provincial strategy to 
mitigate emissions over the longer term. 
 
 
In addition to influencing the adoption of targets and timetables by the 
provinces, the international climate regime is reflected in the choice of policy 
strategies for implementing these targets. A key aspect of the international climate 
regime’s targets and timetables strategy is the corresponding incorporation of 
flexibility mechanisms and market instruments as part of mitigation activity. While 
Canada’s federal government has yet to develop national mechanisms, a number of 
provinces have taken the lead. 
 
 
Two provinces have incorporated carbon taxes into their strategies. Quebec 
was the first province to adopt a carbon tax, in 2007.165 The tax was levied on large 
161 See Ipsos Kyoto 2002, supra note 158. 
162 See e.g. Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 6-1-6-2. 163 For example, see the US National Wildlife Federation’s arguments against Keystone XL Pipeline that 
would increase export potential for Albertan oil, primarily based on implied contribution to global climate 
change and status of oil sands production as a “dirty” fuel, at “Keystone XL Pipeline” (2014), online: 
National Wildlife Federation <http://www.nwf.org/What-We-Do/Energy-and-Climate/Drilling-and-
Mining/Tar-Sands/Keystone-XL-Pipeline.aspx>. To similar effect see David Biello, “How Much Will Tar 
Sands Oil Add to Global Warming?”, Scientific American (23 January 2013), online: Scientific American 
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tar-sands-and-keystone-xl-pipeline-impact-on-global-
warming>. For discussion of lobby efforts to secure EU Fuel Directive imposing penalty on oil sands 
production due to GHG intensity, see e.g. Barbara Lewis, “Nobel Laureates Press EU Leaders on Tar 
Sands Law” (2 October 2013), online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/02/us-eu-
tarsands-idUSBRE9911C520131002>. 
164 See e.g. Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 6-27-6-29 (opposition to Kyoto target based on costs to 
province). 
165 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 67.  
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emitters, including producers and distributors of fossil fuels in the province. 166  
Revenues were directed to supporting government measures related to climate 
change, such as public transit improvement. Quebec’s levy was not to be permanent, 
but phased out and replaced by the province’s cap and trade system. 167 British 
Columbia has also incorporated a carbon tax strategy to reduce emissions, 
introducing a broad based, revenue neutral tax in 2008 levied on emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion.168 The tax generates substantial revenue, $3.7 billion since 
2008, but by law this is returned to British Columbians via reductions in personal, 
small business, and corporate income taxes.169 Both provinces adopted the taxes as a 
market strategy to put a price on carbon more reflective of its environmental impacts, 
and incentivize reductions in fossil fuel consumption that would help these provinces 
reach their emissions targets.  
 
 
The adoption of carbon tax policies in B.C. and Quebec reflect the influence 
of the international regime’s normative call to mitigate climate change. Neither of 
these taxes are primarily motivated by simple revenue generation, as B.C.’s tax is 
revenue neutral, and Quebec’s tax is both temporary and earmarked for climate 
mitigation efforts. As an environmental policy, these stand-alone taxes do not allow 
the provinces imposing them to capture any of the benefits of associated reductions 
in GHG emissions. Although a carbon tax has been identified as the preferable policy 
tool to limit emissions, this is based on imposition of a federal tax, which could 
address potential competitive and trade-related aspects of a carbon tax that lie outside 
provincial jurisdiction.170  
 
 
Provinces have also been active in working to develop cap and trade 
schemes to help mitigate emissions more flexibly. These schemes vary in the extent 
to which they appear to be influenced by the international climate regime.  
 
 
As with climate mitigation targets, Alberta has followed its own path in 
establishing a cap and trade scheme. Alberta introduced the first provincial scheme, 
166 See “Quebec to Collect Nation’s 1st Carbon Tax” (7 June 2007), online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-to-collect-nation-s-1st-carbon-tax-1.684888>. 
167 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 67. 
168 Ibid at 71. For details of B.C.’s Carbon Tax, see Ministry of Finance, “How the Carbon Tax Works”, 
online: The Province of British Columbia <http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca>. See also Mahoney Reporter, supra 
note 94 at 5-33-5-40. 
169 Ibid at 72. 
170 See e.g. Courchene, supra note 103 at 13. On desirability of carbon tax, see also Shi-Ling Hsu, The 
Case for a Carbon Tax (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2011).  
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regulating its large industrial emitters.171 However, rather than a cap on emissions, 
Alberta’s scheme requires a reduction in emissions intensity by 12% relative to a 
2003-2005 baseline. Regulated emitters can meet their obligations under the scheme 
by: complying with the intensity target, purchasing “emissions performance credits” 
from another emitter that has exceeded compliance, purchasing offset credits in 
Alberta’s Carbon Offset market, or paying a charge of $15 per tonne of CO2 
emissions.172 The scheme currently applies to just over 100 emitters, accounting for 
about 50% of Alberta’s emissions. The scheme has resulted in 40Mt of cumulative 
emissions reductions and has generated $398 million in revenue, about half of which 
has been directed toward clean energy projects.173 Alberta’s scheme aligns with the 
international regime’s focus on use of market mechanisms, and incorporation of 
emissions trading to promote cost-effective means of reducing emissions. 
Underpinning the scheme is concern that the international climate regime’s 
mitigation efforts will close markets to Alberta’s resource industries unless they can 
show progress in reducing their GHG emissions. However, Alberta has structured its 
regime in a way that does not impose the large immediate costs of absolute caps. As 
a result, it does not necessarily lead to reduced emissions overall, particularly as the 
“safety valve” option of purchasing emissions intensity has a relatively low price.174 
This diverges from the structure of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, and also limits 
the extent to which Alberta’s scheme can be incorporated into larger cap and trade 
systems to facilitate global climate change mitigation efforts.  
 
 
Other provinces have been working to develop cap and trade schemes for 
emissions that more closely align with the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, with 
greater potential for integration into regional and international climate markets. B.C., 
Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec are members of the Western Climate Initiative, which 
is working toward establishing regional emissions trading. 175  B.C., Ontario and 
Quebec are members of the International Carbon Action Partnership, another 
organization of governments and public authorities working toward mandatory cap 
and trade schemes with hard caps, to develop carbon markets. 176  While some 
provinces, such as B.C., have passed legislation that lays the groundwork for future 
participation in these cap and trade schemes, at present only Quebec has an operative 
171 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 71. For details of Alberta’s scheme, see Alta Reg 
139/2007. See also Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 6-33-6-45. 
172 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 71. 
173 Ibid. 
174 To illustrate, see Coral Davenport “Large Companies Prepared to Pay Price on Carbon” New York 
Times (5 December 2013) online: The New York Times 
Company<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/business/energy-environment/large-companies-prepared-
to-pay-price-on-carbon.html?_r=0> (Exxon Mobil internal pricing for Carbon assumes price of $60/ton). 
175 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 63. 
176 Ibid.  
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scheme.177 Quebec’s scheme came into force in 2012 and its first compliance period 
began in 2013.178 The scheme will initially cover about 80 major emitters, including 
electricity generation and major industrial facilities. In a second phase from 2015 it 
will expand to cover fuel and fossil fuels, including the transportation sector.179 The 
scheme imposes a global cap for all targeted emitters, which will drop over time to 
reduce overall emissions. Emitters will have to cover their emissions via credits once 
the compliance periods begin. They will be assigned some credits by government in 
an initial allocation and will then generate additional credits through emissions 
reductions, or cover emissions via purchased credits. Quebec has adopted regulations 
to harmonize its scheme with the Western Climate Initiative and has entered into an 
agreement with California to formally link their emissions trading schemes.180 While 
they are still at an early stage, these efforts to develop regional cap and trade 
schemes offer opportunities to promote cooperative emissions reductions, while 
reducing the costs of limiting emissions. They have the potential to strengthen 
carbon markets, making investments in emissions mitigation and efficiency for firms 
more lucrative. The use of true caps, with plans to reduce caps over time, offers the 
prospect of real gains in limiting emissions. 
 
 
These cap and trade schemes, as with Alberta’s, are underpinned by belief 
in the eventual adoption of binding commitments to reduce GHG emissions. The 
broad normative commitments under the international climate regime, and the 
evolution toward mitigation targets and timetables for all parties provide 
fundamental support for these beliefs. Multi-lateral initiatives and coordination on 
the establishment of cap and trade schemes can only be justified if restrictions on 
emissions generate a price for GHG emissions. Structural concerns about “leakage” 
of emissions away from regulated jurisdictions help to encourage construction of 
schemes in a way that permits integration. The coordinating role of international and 
transnational law is apparent in the patterning of provincial cap and trade schemes so 
that they can be integrated into federal, regional or international schemes in the 
future.181  
 
 
177 Ibid at 72, discussing B.C.’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act, SBC 2008, c 32. 
178 For general discussion of Quebec’s scheme and a gateway to relevant documents, including the 
regulations and various related orders in council, see “The Québec Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Allowances” (2009), online: Gouvernement du Québec 
<http://www.mddefp.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/Systeme-plafonnement-droits-GES-en.htm>. 
179 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 67. 
180 Ibid. 
181 For example, see Mahoney Reporter, supra note 94 at 5-28-5-33 on this feature of the B.C. scheme. 
See also a discussion on Ontario and Quebec’s progress toward a cap and trade scheme, noting the need 
for flexibility to integrate into larger schemes (ibid at 9-32-9-35).  
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While some provinces have incorporated market approaches to reaching 
their emissions targets, most have pursued industry / sector specific strategies more 
akin to the federal approach. The provinces have tended to target the electricity and 
transportation sectors, with policies for direct regulation to reduce emissions, energy 
efficiency initiatives, and sustainable energy investments. These initiatives track 
GHG mitigation policies identified under Kyoto, and the sectoral focus picks out 
industries that make significant contributions to national and provincial GHG 
emissions profiles. 
 
 
Numerous provinces have focused on the electricity sector. The largest 
absolute gains in this sector in terms of GHG emissions reduction have come from 
Ontario. Its strategy involves phasing out coal fired electricity generation in the 
province. 182  The province has made substantial progress and is scheduled to 
complete the program in 2014.183 Ontario is filling the resulting capacity gap through 
increased conservation, as well as through development of cleaner alternatives, such 
as wind, solar, natural gas and nuclear energy.184 Nova Scotia has also aggressively 
pursued emissions reduction in its electricity sector by legislating a mandatory, 
declining cap on emissions for Nova Scotia Power under its Greenhouse Gas 
Electricity Regulations.185 Facility owners must ensure that the cap is met through 
operations: there is no alternative such as trading of emissions or purchasing of extra 
emissions. Nova Scotia has also established a regulatory goal to increase the share of 
electricity supplied by renewables to 25% by 2015 and 40% by 2020.186 Nova Scotia 
has signed an equivalency agreement with the federal government so that the 
province’s regulations will replace the federal electricity sector regulation.187 Both 
provinces have pursued aggressive strategies to directly cut emissions from carbon 
intensive sources of electricity supply via command and control regulation.  
 
 
Other provinces have decided to cut electricity sector emissions by 
increasing supply from renewable / non-emitting sources. Newfoundland & 
Labrador’s development of its Lower Churchill project is projected to permit the 
province to obtain 98% of its electricity from renewables and phase out oil fired 
182 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 68. This initiative is projected to reduce GHG emissions 
by 30 Mt CO2e relative to 2003. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 NS Reg 260/2009 as amended to OIC 2013-332 (10 September 2013), NS Reg 305/2013. For 
discussion, see National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 65. 
186 See Renewable Electricity Regulations, NS Reg 155/2010 as amended up to OIC 2013-155 (7 May 
2013), NS Reg 204/2013 
187 See National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 65-66.  
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generation.188 PEI is incorporating wind generation, projected to account for 33% of 
the province’s supply.189 New Brunswick has also adopted a target for its utility New 
Brunswick Power to provide 40% of in-province electricity supply from renewable 
sources.190 The province is also re-introducing nuclear electricity generation, which 
it expects to further increase supply from non-emitting sources by 35%. 191  
Manitoba’s Tomorrow Now strategic plan calls for a 43% increase in hydro power 
from 2012 levels over the next 15 years, to be combined with energy saving targets 
and development of other renewables including wind power.192 Other jurisdictions 
that have adopted similar plans to increase renewable / clean electricity as a 
mitigation strategy include B.C., Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Quebec. 
Strategies to reduce emissions from electricity generation are expected to be among 
the most successful mitigation efforts, with a projected reduction of 39 Mt by 2020 
relative to a 2005 base.193 
 
 
As with the federal government, provinces have also turned to the 
transportation sector to address emissions mitigation. A number of provinces support 
development of biofuels as part of their general climate change investment 
strategy. 194 Alberta has adopted a Renewable Fuel Standard, with the renewable 
content to incorporate a 25% reduction in GHG emissions relative to the petroleum 
equivalent. 195  Other provinces have focused on emissions savings in the 
transportation sector through promotion of transit plans. Quebec’s Public Transit 
Policy directed at increasing transit services and ridership exceeded its goals. A new 
plan under development addresses “sustainable mobility.”196 Ontario also has plans 
to improve transit as part of a broader “Big Move Regional Transportation Plan” for 
the Greater Toronto area.197 Nova Scotia has a Sustainable Transportation Strategy 
188 Ibid at 64. 
189 Ibid at 65. 
190 Energy and Mines, “Renewable Portfolio Standard: Description and Background” (2013), online: 
Government of New Brunswick 
<http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/departments/energy/energy_blueprint/content/renewable_portfolio.ht
ml>. 
191 Ibid. 
192 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 69. 
193 Emissions Trends 2013, supra note 93 at 21. 
194 See National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 65 discussing Newfoundland (support for biofuel via 
Green Fund investments); Nova Scotia (support for biofuel development) (ibid); and Ontario (support for 
ethanol industry via Ethanol Growth Fund) (ibid at 69). 
195 Ibid, at 71. The standard requires 2% renewable content in diesel fuel, and 5% renewable alcohol in 
gasoline. 
196 Ibid at 67. 
197 Ibid at 68.  
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that incorporates improvements in transit fleet efficiency as part of its mitigation 
efforts. 198  Another prong of provincial transportation strategies for emissions 
mitigation is the provision of incentives for clean energy vehicles and development 
of infrastructure to support their use.199 Despite this suite of policies directed at the 
transportation sector, effects are projected to be modest as transportation sector 
emissions incorporating both provincial and federal initiatives are expected to 
increase by 8 Mt by 2020.200 
 
 
The sector specific policies of the provinces reflect policy-making in the 
shadow of international climate law. Anticipated binding GHG emissions mitigation 
targets make these sectors natural focal points for action, as they are significant 
contributors to overall emissions. The international regime’s reporting and inventory 
mechanisms help to focus attention on these sectors. For many of the provinces, 
development of clean energy and transportation sectors offer additional benefits 
beyond GHG emissions reduction. For Provinces such as Quebec, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, and Manitoba, international climate change action is likely to enhance 
export opportunities for their expanded climate-friendly energy capacity. 201 Both 
international and provincial normative mitigation commitments, as well as strategic 
interests, support action in these key sectors.  
 
 
In addition to sector-specific regulation, the provinces also incorporate 
strategic investment as part of their climate change mitigation strategies. Provinces 
have directed funds toward efforts to increase energy efficiency, develop various 
clean technologies, and facilitate the use and development of alternative energy 
sources.202 In Alberta and Saskatchewan, investment in the development of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology forms a major component of provincial 
climate change strategy. Saskatchewan has three initiatives in place. Its Weyburn-
198 Ibid at 65. See also discussion of Alberta’s investments in sustainable transit infrastructure (ibid at 71). 
199 Ibid at 72, discussing B.C. (Clean Energy Vehicle Program, incentives for purchase of clean energy 
vehicles (e.g. plug-in electric, hydrogen) and charging infrastructure development); discussing Ontario 
(incentives for purchase of plug-in electric vehicles) (ibid at 68). 
200 Emission Trends 2013, supra note 93 at 21. The increase is relative to a 2005 baseline of 168 Mt. 
Transportation will remain one of the largest contributors to Canada’s projected emissions in 2020. 
201 See e.g. Quebec Action Plan 2013, supra note 146 at 32-33 (province can capitalize on its renewable 
energy capacity); “Energy: Expanding Clean Energy & Energy Efficiency – Manitoba Helping the World” 
(2008), online: Government of Manitoba 
<http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/beyond_kyoto/energy.pdf> (potential for export of Manitoba’s 
low GHG emissions energy to other jurisdictions). 
202 Some common policy choices include investments to increase efficiency in residential and commercial 
settings, development of energy efficient building codes and standards, investments in biomass / biofuels, 
small scale energy generation and feed in tariffs, and methane capture projects related to waste 
management and agriculture.   
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Midale CO2 Monitoring and Storage Project has been in place since 2000, studying 
methods for injecting and storing CO2 in depleted oilfields.203 The Boundary Dam 
Integrated Carbon Capture and Storage Demonstration Project will see one of the 
province’s largest coal-fired electricity generating facilities upgraded for operation in 
2014 with complete carbon capture and storage.204 Saskatchewan’s third project is 
supporting research into the safety and viability of storing liquefied, captured CO2 
underground. 205  Combined, these investments in carbon capture and storage 
represent well over a billion dollars of research and development.206 Alberta has also 
invested heavily in support for carbon capture and storage projects. It is providing 
$1.3 Bn over a 15-year period to support the Shell Quest and Alberta Trunk Line 
projects.207 Alberta’s projects are geared to the capture and transportation of CO2 for 
use in oilfield recovery (and subsequent storage) and underground storage of CO2 to 
reduce the emissions from oil sands upgrading facilities. A condition of the 
investment in the projects is a requirement to share information, making the 
technology accessible for wider adoption.208 
 
 
The influence of international climate law is particularly apparent in these 
investments in CCS technology. The legitimacy of these investments as mitigation 
actions is reinforced by Kyoto’s exemplars, which include research and development 
of technology for carbon sequestration. Both Saskatchewan and Alberta are investing 
in demonstration projects that can be used to develop and share best practices for 
CCS technology. This is also in line with guidance from the international climate 
regime that requires parties to cooperate and facilitate the exchange of information 
and technology transfer. There is significant potential for CCS technology to 
contribute to GHG mitigation, particularly if it is shared with large emitters that rely 
on high emissions sources of energy, such as coal-fired electricity generation. The 
strategic impact of the global climate regime is also a factor in these investments. If 
Alberta is to continue to develop its oil sands resources, then the development of 
CCS technology is vital to curbing emissions in the province and in Canada as a 
203 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 70. The project has generated “best practice” guidelines 
and a scientific publication sharing information about the technology. 
204 Ibid. See also description of the project, “Carbon Capture and Storage” (2014), online: SaskPower 
<http://www.saskpower.com/our-power-future/work-currently-underway/carbon-capture-and-storage/>. 
The captured CO2 will either be stored in a liquid form underground, or sold for use to enhance recovery 
in oilfields where it will remain trapped underground in the process. 
205 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 70. 
206 These projects leverage a combination of federal, provincial and private investment funds. The 
provincial contribution to Boundary Dam is $1 Bn (via SaskPower). Federal funds of $240 million are 
also invested in this project (ibid at 160). 
207 Ibid at 71. See also description of Alberta’s Carbon Capture and Storage initiative and support for these 
projects at Alberta Energy “Carbon Capture and Storage” (2014), online: Government of Alberta 
<http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/1438.asp>. 
208 Ibid.  
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result. The anticipation of binding GHG restrictions, fed by the international climate 
regime, requires a technological solution to preserve the value of these provinces’ 
energy endowments.  
 
 
The review of provincial climate law and policy illustrates that while 
provinces have taken diverse approaches, all have been influenced by the 
international climate regime. Many provinces have adopted ambitious targets and 
timetables for emissions reduction, in line with developed country pledges at 
Copenhagen and for some Kyoto commitments. Most provinces have been 
successful in pursuing these targets up to 2012, employing a range of strategies that 
reflect the structure of the international climate regime. This success is largely driven 
by efforts in the electricity sector. For all provinces, the results from efforts in the 
transportation sector are more sobering; despite federal and provincial policies, 
transportation emissions will rise in aggregate. Achieving the deeper cuts required to 
meet long term mitigation goals (e.g. 2050 targets) will be difficult without better 
results for this large contributor to emissions. Alberta is somewhat of an outlier, as 
both its approach to target setting and mitigation fall outside the norms for developed 
parties in the international regime. Its market mechanism for curbing emissions is 
also both relatively weak and inconsistent with the form of emissions trading 
schemes in the international regime. Unfortunately, the projected level of emissions 
from development of Alberta’s oil sands means that gains by other provinces will be 
completely offset, unless its investments in CCS produce even better results than the 
province projects. The provincial review of mitigation ambition and action illustrates 
that it is difficult to characterize a “Canadian” approach to incorporating the 
international climate regime into domestic law. Provinces’ mitigation actions appear 
to be driven by a combination of normative commitments, coordination efforts, and 
strategic economic concerns, all influenced by the international regime.  
 
 
Mitigation is not the only imperative under the international climate regime, 
although perhaps the most critical for advancing the objective of climate 
stabilization. Adaptation has taken on increased importance for the provinces, as it 
has in the international regime. Most provinces have stand-alone adaptation plans, 
although some have not been updated recently. 209  While each province takes a 
different approach to adaptation, reflective of differing circumstances and concerns, 
there are common features to adaptation planning and provinces are increasingly 
engaged in collaborative regional adaptation planning. An important common 
element of provincial adaptation planning is the identification of climate change 
outcomes and associated risks. The high costs of recent extreme weather events has 
209 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 125. The Atlantic provinces have a joint adaptation 
strategy dating from 2008, and Alberta released its adaptation strategy in 2009. Provinces without stand-
alone strategies address climate change adaptation in other ways, e.g. in general climate change plans, or 
within existing resource / environmental management schemes.  
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highlighted the need for risk assessment, particularly in light of IPCC 5’s conclusion 
that climate change is inevitable and such events will be more likely. 210  The 
generation of impact planning and assessment tools is part of this aspect of 
adaptation strategy. 211 Collaborative research involving the provinces and federal 
government also informs this dimension of adaptation planning. 212  Adaptation 
planning and assessment involves multiple dimensions, including: assessment of 
human impacts (e.g. health, resilience, well-being of communities), resilience and 
adaptation of economic activity, infrastructure considerations, and vulnerability and 
adaptation in ecological systems.213 A common theme across provincial strategies is 
the “mainstreaming” or integration of climate change adaptation into decision-
making processes.214 Finally, plans point to informed actions to support communities 
and address climate change adaptation requirements. 
 
 
Individually and collectively, the provinces appear to have moved in step 
with the international regime’s enhanced focus on adaptation. The work to generate 
and share relevant information on climate change impacts and risks, mainstreaming 
of climate change considerations into decision-making, and assessment of 
vulnerability of communities and ecosystems all conform to international adaptation 
norms. The push toward an increased focus on adaptation has been supported by the 
international climate regime’s information generation. The increased scientific 
certainty and specificity about the potential effects of climate change from the work 
of the IPCC have helped spur confidence in the need for adaptation planning.215 The 
international regime’s inventory and reporting mechanisms have made the growing 
emissions gap manifest, further underlining the likelihood of significant, unavoidable 
effects from climate change. 
 
210 Ibid at 121 (discussion of risk from extreme weather and associated costs, including examples of 
flooding in Toronto and Alberta in June 2013). 
211 Ibid at 126, discussing as an example use of mapping software to incorporate predicted regional climate 
effects for B.C. in planning. See also a discussion on the use of “agro-climate” mapping tool to assist 
farming sector in adaptation decision-making in Quebec (ibid at 133). See also discussion of various 
climate change adaptation assessment tools, for use by various decision-makers, including municipalities, 
First Nations who may lack resources and capacity for developing them independently (ibid at 123). 
212 Ibid at 125, discussing role of federal research and knowledge generation to support adaptation 
planning. See also a discussion of Manitoba’s adaptation strategy, work toward shared understanding of 
climate risks, and collaboration (ibid at 126), and a discussion of the Regional Adaptation Collaborative 
program (ibid at 127). 
213 Ibid at 125-126. These features can be identified in various provincial strategies, e.g. Quebec, the 
Territories, B.C. 
214 Ibid. See e.g. adaptation plan for Quebec (integrating adaptation into new legislation and policy), the 
Territories (mainstreaming adaptation into government operations and decision-making). 
215 See e.g. Quebec Action Plan 2013, supra note 146 at 3 (IPCC and science behind anticipated impacts 
in Quebec, need for action).  
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All provinces have responded to climate change with increased generation 
of information about emissions, impacts, and mitigation and adaptation responses. 
Canada’s provinces and territories all participate in the Climate Registry, a 
continental, sub-national initiative to develop and promote a common reporting 
system.216 Provincial participation in regional schemes, such as the Western Climate 
Initiative, also promotes more robust and comparable collection of provincial climate 
change data. Provincial GHG inventories and initiatives are also included in 
Canada’s National Communications under the FCCC, incorporating estimated 
impacts for policies that have been implemented. These developments promote 
access to information on inventories of emissions and the effect of measures by 
province and sector. 217 At a provincial level, there is increased transparency and 
rigour in the communication of climate change information. Provinces also 
increasingly engage the public in climate change policy-making, and through 
education and outreach encourage individuals to undertake voluntary action to 
combat climate change.218 These developments also reflect the emerging norms of 
the international climate regime, particularly the move toward more transparent and 
robust communication of climate change mitigation actions and their effects, 
benchmarking progress toward quantified goals.  
 
 
An examination of climate law and policy at the provincial level illustrates 
the complexity of the manner in which international law is “taken up” domestically. 
Some elements of the international climate regime are reflected in the actions of 
almost all provinces – such as the adoption of quantified emissions reduction targets 
and timetables. However, the precise nature of these implemented commitments 
varies substantially across provinces. While all provinces have undertaken mitigation 
actions that conform to the suggested range of policy choices in the international 
regime, the particular set of policies and the ambition of mitigation targets vary 
considerably across provinces. Similarly, provinces display significant variation in 
the extent to which they employ market mechanisms in their climate change strategy, 
as opposed to command and control regulation, or investment in alternative 
technology that will (hopefully) lead to favourable climate outcomes. The generality 
and flexibility of the FCCC obligations in particular generally permits and even 
encourages this range of outcomes. However, in light of both Canada’s Copenhagen 
pledge and an emerging consensus that mitigation actions must be strengthened, the 
failure of some provinces to achieve any emissions reductions leaves them outside 
the range of permitted climate policy under the international regime. This lack of 
“effectiveness” of international law might suggest that it is not important to domestic 
216 National Communication 6, supra note 97 at 64. 
217 Ibid at 208-229. 
218 Ibid at 199-200. Development of provincial climate change plans also involves broad based 
consultation, including involvement of the public.  
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action. However, the review of provincial law and policy suggests that even in these 
provinces, governments are motivated to take action to try and conform in some way 
to the norms from the international regime. This is not entirely surprising, as the 
international climate regime increasingly provides a benchmark against which 
behaviour can be readily measured and normatively judged, leading to pressure from 
extra-legal sources. While the incorporation of international climate law and its 
norms is not uniform across provinces, it is universally relevant to provincial climate 
law and policy. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At one time international law’s effectiveness was judged primarily in relation to its 
formal applicability to states and the strength of its internal legal mechanisms for 
enforcement. Theorists have come to have more complex theories of its influence 
and scholars have argued that international law can become domestically influential 
through various channels. States may be influenced to take action based on the 
implications of international law for preserving their own interests, and international 
law can help shape collective state action by facilitating international coordination.219 
International law is also thought to provide a normative framework that can induce 
states to comply, playing a role in constructing the values that states use to judge the 
legitimacy of their policies.220 Recently, scholars have suggested that international 
law can become influential in a domestic setting through its influence on public 
opinion. The existence of an international obligation helps to influence the way that 
individuals assess state behaviour, with individuals more receptive to actions that 
bring states in line with international commitments.221 Individuals may be informed 
about international law and its implied requirements by becoming aware of the 
actions of geographically and culturally proximate states. In this way international 
norms can spread through effects on broader public opinion and corresponding 
pressure for government to conform to international law. 222  The theory of 
international law’s influence on state decision-making is complex and can involve 
diffuse but powerful effects. The reality for many states, including Canada, is that 
this theory can be applied at a sub-national level, when jurisdiction to take domestic 
actions to implement international law is held by multiple actors within the state. 
 
219 See e.g. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 7. 
220 See e.g. Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8. 
221 See e.g. Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James D Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the 
Escalation of International Disputes” (1994) 88:3 The American Political Science Review 577; Geoffrey 
PR Wallace, “International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study” (2013) 67 
International Organization 105; Chilton, supra note 12. 
222 See e.g. Linos, supra note 10.  
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 This theory suggests that we should look beyond the formal structure of the 
international regime to understand how it may influence government behaviour in 
Canada. The review of federal and provincial climate law and policy illustrates the 
complex interaction of the forces producing the domestic influence of international 
law, and the diversity of policy outcomes supported. In a number of provinces, both 
provincial economic interests and normative commitments by the public appear to 
influence climate policy, pushing toward more significant uptake of international 
climate law and norms. In other provinces, notably Alberta, an interest-based 
approach appears to drive the province’s engagement with international climate law, 
urging a more minimalist and resistant approach. Across the actions of the Canadian 
federal and provincial governments, the influence of the international regime can be 
traced through: more pervasive and robust generation and reporting of climate 
change information; increased prominence of GHG emissions targets and timetables; 
increased use of market mechanisms with potential for integration into international / 
global schemes; focus on specific sectors for GHG mitigation efforts; increasingly 
cooperative and coordinated GHG mitigation actions; and an increased priority for 
adaptation. Many of these actions can be explained by more traditional theories of 
international law and international relations, and particularly the “threat” of 
economic repercussions if key markets such as the U.S. and E.U. link trade policy to 
climate change action. However, the role of the international climate regime in 
shaping public perceptions of the threat posed by climate change and the 
corresponding obligation on governments to take action should not be lightly 
dismissed. 
 
 
Recent public opinion research suggests that Canadians perceive climate 
change as a real threat.223 Independent research suggests that Canadians also believe 
that climate change should be a top priority for the federal government, and favour 
Canada’s participation in an international treaty to limit greenhouse gas emissions.224 
A 2013 Angus Reid poll shows 60% of Canadians favour acting to protect the 
environment, even if it has negative consequences for economic growth.225 However, 
the poll also shows varying regional belief in the existence of anthropogenic climate 
change, with significantly lower support in Alberta (42%) and 
Saskatchewan/Manitoba (49%) than in British Columbia (57%), Ontario (60%), 
Quebec (62%), and the Atlantic provinces (68%). This collection of opinion data 
suggests that while Canadian public opinion may put pressure on governments to act 
223 In a 2013 opinion poll conducted by the Pew center, 54% of Canadians polled indicated global climate 
change was a threat to the country, putting it at the top of all tested items, which included international 
financial instability, Islamist extremists, and Iran’s nuclear program, among other items. See “Climate 
Change: Key Data Points from Pew Research” (27 January 2014), online: Pew Research Center 
<http://www.pewresearch.org>. 
224 See discussion of poll results in McCarthy & Blackwell, supra note 100. 
225 See Angus Reid 2013, supra note 152.  
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to address climate change, it is likely to vary in force, depending on the region in 
question. While the polling research does not directly tackle the question of whether 
international law influences the way individuals think about government action, it is 
plausible that government failure to meet Canada’s commitments under international 
law negatively influences public opinion. The review of provincial climate change 
policy does indicate stronger action in provinces with majority belief in the threat of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
 
 
 The willingness of a number of Canada’s provinces to take action on 
climate change, despite a lack of leadership at the federal level, suggests that it is 
politically astute to conform to basic international climate norms in many parts of the 
country. While many provincial climate plans stress the economic case for taking 
action, there is also a strong moral dimension to the choice to act to reduce 
emissions. The effects of climate change are already beginning to appear in many 
regions, reinforcing the consequences of failure to take action. Additionally, there is 
a risk that failure to act consistently with international norms, particularly mitigation 
obligations, can be deployed to mobilize public opinion against Canada in other 
jurisdictions. Recent developments in the U.S. have seen environmental groups, 
individuals and even cities taking action to block the shipment of Alberta’s oil sands 
production through the U.S., potentially frustrating access to key markets.226 In a 
similar vein, environmentalists and a group of Nobel Laureates have lobbied the E.U. 
to classify oilsands crude oil as “dirty” under its Fuel Directive relative to other 
crudes, because of its negative implications for GHG emissions and potential impact 
on climate change. 227  The international climate regime provides key normative 
benchmarks against which Canada’s actions can be judged. As such, the structure of 
this regime is likely to continue to be an important driver of climate law and policy 
in Canada.  
   
 
226 For example, see the US National Wildlife Federation's arguments against approval of Keystone, 
primarily based on its contribution to global climate change and status as a “dirty” fuel, at: 
<http://www.nwf.org/What-We-Do/Energy-and-Climate/Drilling-and-Mining/Tar-Sands/Keystone-XL-
Pipeline.aspx.>. To similar effect see David Biello, “How Much Will Tar Sands Oil Add to Global 
Warming?” Scientific American (January 23, 2013), available online: 
<http://www.scientificamerican.com>.  See also “South Portland, Maine, Passes Oilsands Moratorium”, 
The Huffington Post Canada (17 December 2013) online: TheHuffingtonPost.com 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca> (this would block a different access route to markets for oilsands 
production). 
227 See e.g. Lewis, supra note 163.  
                                                        
